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Justinian’s Frankish War, 552‒c. 560 
Sihong Lin, University College Dublin 
 
The Gothic War was a defining event of Justinian’s reign, bringing both a short-term triumph for 
the ambitious emperor and a province plagued by threats back into the Eastern Roman Empire. 
Launched to take advantage of infighting within the ruling house of Ostrogothic Italy, early 
successes were quickly achieved by 540, but the following decade was more fraught for the 
Romans. Not only were the Goths now led by the capable Totila (r. 541‒552), the conflict also 
drew the attention of the Merovingian kingdoms in Gaul.1 Despite being open to imperial 
overtures initially, from 537/8 onwards Frankish forces under King Theudebert I of Austrasia (r. 
533‒547/8) first aided the Goths and then increasingly aimed to directly seize Italian territories.2 
This culminated in the invasion of 553, in which two Alamanni duces who nominally served 
Theudebald (r. 547/8‒555), Theudebert’s son, invaded Italy. Narses, the imperial generalissimo, 
defeated these invaders in 554, a battle that for many historians represented a decisive end to this 
decades-long conflict.3  
 The following years are rarely treated in detail, with modern narratives running to mere 
pages or paragraphs, which suggest to the reader that the last vestiges of conflict were mere 
footnotes to what had come before.4 Yet the Italian peninsula in the late 550s was far from 
peaceful. Clues to an enduring conflict are preserved in both Greek and Latin sources, but 
unfortunately surviving texts neither provide a continuous narrative nor add the depth of detail 
found in accounts of Procopius of Caesarea and Agathias of Myrina. Events in Italy after 555, 
for example, are no longer narrated in detail by a near-contemporary Greek source, for Agathias 
left his work unfinished and its continuation, Menander the Guardsman’s History, only survives 
in fragments.5 Near-contemporary chronicles, such as the Constantinopolitan edition of John 
Malalas’ Greek text or the Latin work of Marius of Avenches from Frankish Burgundy, likewise 
comment on Italian affairs, but laconically and only when they impinge on their chief interests.6 
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Narrating the aftermath of the Gothic War, even for elements as fundamental as the dates and 
the key political players involved, is therefore far from straightforward. 
 One piece of this puzzle is the fate of Frankish Italy. Having repeatedly intervened in the 
Gothic War and seized, or were given control over, various provinces, how Merovingian rulers 
defended their Italian territories after the Gothic War remains an understudied topic. Many 
reconstructions of this period attempt to link together the often-contradictory texts to offer a 
coherent narrative, with the broad consensus settling on gradual territorial losses in the 550s, 
perhaps with the Franks retaining a sliver of Venetia.7 As the course of Frankish history has 
received renewed attention in recent years, it would be appropriate to flesh out this narrative and 
develop a new synthesis of the abundant scholarship.  
 With the integral connections, whether cultural, diplomatic, or economic, between Gaul 
and the Mediterranean having now been firmly established, we can also reframe the Italian 
conflict within this context of continuous interactions.8 The ongoing debate over the Three 
Chapters, Justinian’s signature theological concern, was for example a persistent issue that drew 
in the Frankish church and its impact on diplomatic matters needs to be reconsidered. The royal 
protagonists concerned, Theudebald and his great-uncles, King Childebert I of Paris (r. 511‒558) 
and King Chlothar I of Soissons (r. 511‒561), likewise deserves further analysis, for one king’s 
hostility to Constantinople did not imply that others acted in a similar fashion. Indeed, given the 
endemic conflict between relatives within the Merovingian dynasty, it would be more plausible to 
suggest that each ruler would act to counter his competitors’ interests abroad. This renewed 
focus on the primary sources needs also be applied to the vibrant historiography. Among 
Byzantinists, the most important contribution is perhaps Dariusz Brodka’s 2018 monograph on 
Narses, the imperial generalissimo who repeatedly defeated the Franks in Italy, which artfully 
fuses together the Latin and Greek evidence to provide a valuable reconstruction of the Italian 
wars.9 Florian Battistella’s 2017 volume on Pope Pelagius I (556–561) similar strengthens our 
understanding of this frequently-disregarded pope, whose letters reveal much about Frankish-
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Roman contacts beyond military matters.10 Combined with more fine-grained studies published 
by historians of the early medieval West, it is now possible to chart the history of Merovingian 
Italy as one part of a larger story entangling both emperors and kings, in which conflict did not 
preclude more nuanced exchanges across the Mediterranean.  
 This article thus embraces a broader vantage point. By surveying Frankish involvement 
in Italy from 552 until c. 560, it aims to account in full the far from straightforward trajectory of 
Merovingian-Roman relations. Instead of an unimportant epilogue to the Gothic War, Justinian’s 
Frankish War, for lack of a better descriptor, proved to be a long-term headache for 
Constantinople. While the Frankish invasion of 553 has received some attention, the war 
following Theudebald’s death, which was led by Chlothar after he inherited the young king’s 
realm, has yet to be examined in its full context. For example, by also investigating the host of 
other issues faced by Chlothar, we can trace how and why the conflict was initially disastrous for 
the Franks. From 558 onwards, however, the king’s problems in Gaul resolved themselves and it 
was imperial fortunes that faltered, leading to a truce that preserved Merovingian Italy. This 
change of prospects hinged much on the death of Childebert of Paris, whose reign has similarly 
been neglected in the historiography of the Italian wars. A reading of his correspondence with 
Rome reveals that he pursued a more conciliatory approach with the Roman Empire, while his 
war with his younger brother Chlothar after 555 likewise needs to be viewed with events beyond 
Gaul in mind. This new narrative does not only strengthen our understanding of Mediterranean 
diplomacy, for it also reshapes our interpretation of the oft-maligned Three Chapters 
controversy and Pelagius I. The pope’s letters to Gaul, one of which recently characterized as a 
‘pathetic plea’, were written amidst a long-running struggle for Italy, making his neglected words 
crucial clues to imperial diplomacy in the 550s.11 Drawing these often fragmentary narratives 
together, I suggest that the Frankish War ought not to be seen as a mere afterthought to the far 
better-recorded Gothic War, but was a conflict that still deserves greater attention from both 
Byzantinists and historians of the post-Roman West. 
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Theudebald’s War, 552‒555 
 
The year 552 proved to be the end of Ostrogothic hopes for victory in the Gothic War. The 
charismatic Totila fought against Narses in June/July 552 at Taginae, but fell in battle and his 
forces were routed. His short-lived successor, Teia, fared no better, as he was promptly defeated 
and killed in October the same year.12 Nonetheless, Gothic holdouts remained in places such as 
Cumae and Lucca, while another group sought the aid of the Franks to continue the fight.13 This 
was an understandable choice for the diehard resistance, since Theudebert of Austrasia had 
secured territories throughout northern Italy as imperial and Gothic armies kept each other 
occupied.14 In the seventh-century Life of John of Réomé composed by Jonas of Bobbio, 
Theudebert’s expedition into Italy was even associated with the removal of imperial jurisdiction 
over Gaul, which is perhaps another hint of the king’s decisive break with the empire.15 Parts of 
Liguria were likely seized in 539, while the Cottian Alps were lost to the Franks at some point in 
the early 540s.16 A substantial portion of Venetia, finally, was handed over as part of a treaty of 
friendship with the embattled Goths in 546/7.17 As the Gothic regime fractured in 552, it is also 
evident the Frankish forces acted opportunistically to defend their interests, for example by 
preventing the city of Verona from being seized by imperial forces.18 Given that Teia had already 
tried to secure Frankish reinforcement in the second half of 552, it is little wonder that after his 
death the final Gothic stalwarts would hold out hope for another military intervention.19   
 The Austrasian king in 552 was Theudebald, the teenage son of Theudebert, and the only 
source for his response, the Greek historian Agathias, noted that the young ruler refused to be 
involved. Yet two Alamanni brothers, Butilinus and Leutharis, both high in the esteem of the 
Frankish court, nonetheless decided to take an army of 75,000 men into Italy to fight nominally 
on the Goths’ side, with Agathias supposing that they had territorial conquest in mind instead.20 
While much of modern scholarship agrees with Agathias that the Italian expedition was the 
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brainchild of the two brothers and not Theudebald, other sources paint a more complex 
picture.21 An earlier bout of fighting between Franks and Romans had already occurred after 
Theudebald’s accession in 548 and resulted in the death of a Frankish dux.22 This conflict was 
presumably a localized affair, since it is not mentioned in Procopius’ detailed narrative of the 
Gothic War, but as the conflict was described by Marius of Avenches as a “Roman war,” the 
same description the chronicler gave to Butilinus’ Italian adventure, this struggle most likely took 
place in Italy, where both Frankish and Roman forces were active.23 Since only Austrasian Franks 
had a foothold in the peninsula, Marius’ brief notice therefore suggests that some in 
Theudebald’s kingdom, whether under direct orders or as free agents operating from Austrasian 
territories, had already fought against the empire.24 Procopius further reported that in 552, 
Frankish forces in Venetia sought to hinder Narses’ Italian expedition.25 As a large portion of 
Gothic Venetia was granted to Theudebert, this Frankish blocking force, again, likely served 
Theudebald at least on a nominal level.  
 Finally, the Austrasian court had also made its feelings known when it defiantly defended 
the actions of the young king’s father against imperial accusations of misconduct, a rebuttal 
recorded both in Procopius and a dossier preserved in the epistolary collection now known as 
the Austrasian Letters.26 Combined with Procopius’ report of Teia’s (dashed) hopes of Frankish 
aid and Agathias’ claim that the Gothic stalwarts preferred to seek aid from Theudebald over 
Chlothar and Childebert (allegedly due to their realms’ distance from northern Italy), it is 
eminently possible that the Austrasian court, if not the young king himself, was already hostile to 
imperial interests.27 When Butilinus and Leutharis invaded, Teia was admittedly already dead, but 
an Austrasian army would still have been of use for the empire’s enemies, for Gothic holdouts 
remained defiant.28 A muscular response would no doubt also have deterred imperial forces from 
capitalizing on their success by advancing on Frankish-held territories in northern Italy, even if 
we put aside the attraction of simple conquest. Regardless of young Theudebald’s personal 
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involvement in his regime, the Austrasian establishment would therefore have had ample reasons 
to support an Italian expedition. 
 Agathias’ historiographical context likewise needs to be considered. The sole historian to 
record Theudebald’s reluctance to intervene was writing in the 570s, when some in 
Constantinople wished to broker an alliance with the Franks in order to contain the Lombards in 
Italy. As such, the historian presented a very positive interpretation of the Merovingian rulers, 
despite their history of conflict with the empire.29 The same narrative strategy is applicable to his 
account of the Austrasian invasion of Italy, for he ascribed the initiative exclusively to the 
Alamanni Butilinus and Leutharis. The Alamanni, furthermore, were described in a moralizing 
excursus as a pagan people, which further distanced these ‘barbarians’ from the Christian Franks 
whom Agathias favoured.30 However, since Butilinus was reportedly a general who had served 
Theudebert in Italy as early as 539, he was most likely a long-term member of the Austrasian 
establishment and would have been the ideal candidate to lead the army meant to reinforce 
Teia.31 Indeed, Brodka rightfully highlights that sources other than Agathias all describe the 
expedition as a Frankish invasion, which is suggestive of how this intervention was viewed by 
sixth- and seventh-century observers.32 We can push this interpretation a little further, for one of 
Justinian’s constitutions that was sent to Narses in Italy specifically referred to a “recent 
incursion of Franks”, thus dating the edict to shortly after 554.33 This law survives only in one 
manuscript and in fragmentary form, but if this particular phrasing is at all representative, then 
we possess a very early official perspective on Butilinus’ invasion – that Narses clashed with the 
Franks, not the Alamanni.  
 Butilinus and Leutharis both met their end in Italy, the former in battle with Narses while 
the latter and allegedly his entire army succumbed to disease, but the aftershocks of their 
invasion remain understudied.34 The historian Agathias, unfortunately, does not advance his 
story much further, as he then moves on to the final subjugation of a Gothic garrison in 555, an 
event that he placed around the time of Theudebald’s death the same year.35 Thus ends Agathias’ 
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Italian narrative, even though he continued to chronicle events on the eastern front up to 559, 
which suggests that his Histories were not completed, presumably due to his untimely death.36 
Nonetheless, Agathias writes that Narses was aware that there would be more conflict with the 
Franks and gave a speech (no doubt one invented by the historian) warning Roman soldiers that 
as only a small number of Franks have been defeated, this imperial victory could provoke yet 
more incursions.37 Given that Agathias wrote in the 570s, he was in a good position to know that 
this conflict would continue and so able to hint to the reader in the completed part of his 
Histories that Narses’ work was not yet done. Indeed, the ending of the Italian narrative as we 
have it, the inheritance of Theudebald’s territories by Chlothar, would have provided an excellent 
introduction for Agathias to the next phase of the war, which would now be conducted by 
Narses against a king who had thus far played a minimal role in Italy.38 
 
Chlothar’s War, 555–c. 560 
 
Unfortunately, we are left with a dearth of sources for the following years, with reconstructions 
of Italian events dependent on the Burgundian Marius of Avenches, the letters of Pope Pelagius 
I, and the anonymous chronicle now known as the Copenhagen Continuation of Prosper. According to 
Marius’ Chronicle, in 556 Frankish forces first defeated the Romans, before the empire seized the 
initiative and conquered ‘the part of Italy that King Theudebert had acquired’, which must refer 
to Frankish holdings in the Cottian Alps, Liguria, and Venetia.39 The victory is not fleshed out in 
any other source, but Brodka plausibly attributed one surviving quotation from Menander the 
Guardsman’s History, which described Narses’ flight from a rare battlefield reverse, as possible 
corroboration to the defeat described by Marius.40 In terms of chronology, as Marius had 
misplaced the death of Butilinus to 555 instead of 554, it is possible that in reality this series of 
battles was similarly misdated and so should be placed c. 555 instead. However, as the conquest 
of Merovingian Italy was unlikely to have been accomplished within a year, it would remain 
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prudent to be more ambiguous and posit that warfare continued into the late 550s and ended at 
an unknown point. This interpretation is supported by letters written by Pope Pelagius in 559, 
which together suggest that parts of Liguria and Venetia returned to Roman authority before this 
point, leading scholars such as Stein and Brodka to place an end to the war around 558/9.41 One 
caveat nonetheless remains, as in another neglected letter written in 560/1, Pelagius bewailed the 
devastation wrought on Italy by “over twenty-five years” of war to the praetorian prefect of 
North Africa.42 If read literally, it suggests that embers of conflict remained potentially as late as 
561, long after the beginning of the Gothic War in 535, though of course it is equally plausible 
that the pope had exaggerated the situation for rhetorical effect.43  
 The campaign to conquer Frankish Italy is otherwise undocumented by near-
contemporary texts, and we are reliant on yet more oblique references in later sources. The 
Copenhagen Continuation of Prosper, a Lombard composition first completed around 625 that 
continued Prosper of Aquitaine’s fifth-century chronicle, warrants particular attention.44 Much of 
the sixth-century narrative in this text is muddled, with a certain “Asbadus” being the general 
who was initially sent by Justinian to conquer Italy, instead of Belisarius. This general allegedly 
campaigned chiefly in Liguria and then died in Pavia in the “second year” of Justinian, which led 
to Narses being sent instead, who conclusively ended the war. 45 This is of course incorrect and 
speaks of a seventh-century author attempting, and failing, to plausibly tie together the principal 
sources at their disposal, the Chronicle of Isidore of Seville and Asbadus’ epitaph in Pavia, which 
is quoted in full.46 Nonetheless, Asbadus has generally been identified as a Gepid who served 
Narses and who had, according to Procopius, slain Totila in 552.47 This Asbadus does not 
feature in later Greek sources, but given his early appearance in Narses’ following, it is certainly 
reasonable for him to be eventually promoted further in Italy to become a magister militum, 
Asbadus’ title as preserved in this seventh-century text. As his epitaph references Asbadus’ 
conquest of Liguria and the “Gothic Alps” for the empire, the conflict described has thus been 
tied to Narses’ retaking of northern Italy in the 550s.48 An error in this account, the impossible 
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claim that Asbadus had died in the “second year” of Justinian, has meanwhile been plausibly 
suggested to be a mistaken reference instead to Emperor Justin II.49 This would be a very 
understandable mistake, for even the well-informed Liber pontificalis had misnamed Justin as 
Justinian in the seventh century.50 More recently, both Christophe Badel and Dariusz Brodka 
have suggested that this dating clause originally did not refer to an emperor’s regnal year, but that 
it was originally a reference to the general dying in the second year of his term as a magister 
militum.51 Although we cannot ascertain what occurred in Venetia, we can therefore presume that 
it was under Asbadus’ leadership that Liguria was conquered by imperial forces, even though the 
precise details remain unrecoverable. 
 From this brief overview, it suffices to say here that Frankish territorial losses were heavy, 
even if we are restricted to only using the words of Marius of Avenches and Pope Pelagius. What 
happened next is still more tortuous to reconstruct. According to Menander the Guardsman, in a 
later encounter with Frankish forces that took place around 561, a Roman official noted that 
there was a truce between the empire and the Franks, which is suggestive of an end to this 
conflict.52 Moreover, Menander places this meeting at the bank of the river Adige, which flows 
past the city of Verona, and adds that the Frankish commander blocked Narses’ crossing. The 
whole of Venetia was thus not under imperial control, for a Merovingian army was able to 
hinder Narses’ movement near such a major settlement. As John Malalas’ Chronicle further 
describes Verona as a “city of the Goths” when news of its fall was triumphantly sent to 
Constantinople in 562, it seems unlikely that the Frankish army was invading imperial territories, 
for otherwise it would have been pointless for a Roman envoy to remind the Franks of their 
existing truce, or that Verona was an imperial city in revolt.53 If this is the case, then Merovingian 
Italy was perhaps a rather less moribund entity by the end of the 550s than it is often supposed, 
since it could intervene in favour of an independent “Gothic” city. With some settlements still 
under Gothic control, it would also provide a plausible context for this truce, as it implies that 
earlier imperial successes against the Franks did not last.  
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 Thus, while it is often simply said that there was a treaty between the Franks and the 
Romans, particular with regards to a sliver of Venetia remaining under Frankish control, what 
this means in context of Marius’ statement needs to be refined further.54 Menander’s fragmentary 
account, for instance, can be read together with a brief comment by Gregory of Tours. 
According to this Gallo-Roman bishop, an area of unknown size in north-eastern Italy 
conquered by King Childebert II of Austrasia (r. 575‒596) had once belonged to his father, 
Sigibert I (r. 561‒575).55 It is possible, as Carl Hammer and Simon Loseby suggest, that this only 
referred to the Italian territories Sigibert had gained in 574/5, when Paul the Deacon reported 
that the fortress of Nano in Trent surrendered to the Franks.56 Other territorial gains beyond this 
site, however, were not noted for this raid by Paul. Indeed, the historian then noted that the 
Franks were driven out by a Lombard dux, which Paul placed around the time of Sigibert’s death 
in 575.57 The Frankish conquest of Nano was thus an exceedingly ephemeral one, making it 
rather unlikely that this minor gain by Sigibert at the end of the king’s life was what Gregory of 
Tours had meant. Frankish Venetia, on the other hand, was a more substantial piece of territory 
and would have been inherited by Sigibert upon Chlothar I’s death in 561, making it a fitting goal 
for Childebert’s forces decades later, a point first made by Richard Heuberger in 1932.58 Marius 
was therefore wrong to say that Theudebert’s gains were lost, for Frankish Venetia remained in 
existence nearly a decade after the climactic defeat of Totila and Teia. Even so, this conclusion 
only raises the question of why northern Italy was not retaken by imperial forces in the 550s. 
Narses, after all, was an accomplished general and it seems illogical not to take major settlements 
such as Verona if his earlier campaigns were entirely successful. 
 A little more light can be shined on this war in the late 550s, however, by an awareness 
that Narses clashed not only with the forces of Theudebald, but also that of his grand-uncle, 
Chlothar I. After Theudebald’s death in 555, his kingdom was seized by Chlothar instead of 
being shared with his other surviving grand-uncle, Childebert I.59 The war in Italy was therefore 
fought by forces that served, at least nominally, Chlothar and the eventual truce, blurry though it 
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may be, was likewise forged under his reign. Chlothar, unfortunately, remains an enigma for 
much of the Gothic War and we cannot establish his stance, if any, to the war between Goths 
and Romans.60 Yet he undoubtedly had to take an interest in Italy, for Marius of Avenches 
ascribes a victory and defeat for Frankish forces that he dates to after Chlothar’s inheritance of 
Theudebald’s kingdom.61 Modern scholars who turn their eye to Chlothar’s attitudes to Italy 
have so far only highlighted the other threats the king had to deal with, namely the rebellion of 
his son Chramn and wars with the Saxons.62 In their interpretations, these conflicts drew 
Chlothar’s attention more than the war against the empire, which, when combined with military 
defeats in Italy, contributed to the eventual truce. As Merovingian Italy was preserved under his 
watch, Chlothar’s reign nonetheless merits further analysis.  
 One clue is provided by a diplomatic revolution between the Franks and the Lombards, 
as seen by the marriage of Chlothar’s daughter Chlodoswintha to Alboin, the future ruler of 
Lombard Italy, at some point in 555‒61.63 There had been a tense relationship between the 
Lombards and Theudebald, as both the young king and his father had married Lombard 
princesses of the previous ruling dynasty overthrown by Alboin’s father.64 After Theudebald’s 
death in 555, Chlothar may have attempted to maintain an anti-Lombard stance, for Gregory of 
Tours reported that he had a relationship with Walderada, the Austrasian king’s widow.65 
Chlothar allegedly put her aside after criticism from his bishops and gave the former queen in 
marriage to the dux of the Bavarians, which, when combined with the reported marriage of his 
daughter to Alboin, a scion of the new Lombard ruling dynasty, can be interpreted as an attempt 
at rapprochement with the Lombards.66  
 Forging better relations with the Lombards was an astute move, for despite Paul the 
Deacon’s claim that the Lombards were always friends of Constantinople while they had 
remained in Pannonia, his account is not borne out by earlier sources.67 The Lombards’ last 
appearances in Procopius’ Wars were not happy ones. In 552, imperial reinforcement for a 
Lombard attack on the Gepids was delayed, causing a Lombard embassy to reproach Justinian 
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for not honouring their alliance.68 In the same year in Italy, Narses had to send away the 
Lombard auxiliaries under his command as they were too lawless for his liking.69 We know 
nothing more until a decade later, when Justinian had allegedly planned to settle the Avars in 
Pannonia Secunda in 562, a move that would have damaged the interests of both the Gepids and 
the Lombards, the two competing powers in the region.70 The Lombard relationship with 
Constantinople had evidently become much worse by 566/7, when the new emperor, Justin II, 
sent an army to help the Gepids defeat the Lombards.71 The Lombards were therefore certainly 
not constant friends of the empire before 568, for they had recently been at war, and it would 
also be plausible to suggest that ties had been cooling ever since 552. Neil Christie’s suggestion, 
that the Frankish marriage was an indication of Lombards’ distance from the empire, is thus 
quite justified.72 Given the Italian war of the late 550s, it would indicate that Chlothar, whether 
he was currently in conflict with the empire or had recently secured a truce, was nonetheless 
creating marriage ties with another polity that was also increasingly at rift with Constantinople. 
The marriage, although undatable with any more precision, is therefore a further clue to 
Chlothar’s war with the empire. 
 The problems of Chramn and the Saxons were similarly more complicated, for both 
issues had been resolved in Chlothar’s favour by 558. Chramn broke with his father in 555 and 
gained the support of Childebert, his uncle.73 The uncle and the nephew then both campaigned 
against Chlothar in 556/7.74 The Saxon war was also, according to Gregory of Tours, incited by 
Childebert.75 Nonetheless, no matter how dangerous these conflicts were for Chlothar, they were 
promptly resolved in December 558 with Childebert’s death.76 As modern reconstructions place 
the conquest of much of Frankish Italy as having been completed by 558/9, the chronological 
coincidence is a convenient one indeed. With the resolution of his internal woes and his 
reunification of the Merovingian kingdoms, Chlothar now had an opportunity to stabilise the so-
far disastrous Italian situation and negotiate a truce with Narses. The Romans may likewise have 
had reason to be cautious, for an outbreak of the plague afflicted Constantinople in 558, while 
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Kutrigur raiders breached the Long Walls in 559, allegedly causing panic in the capital.77 It is 
therefore possible that imperial resources were again overstretched, making efforts to end the 
long-running conflict in Italy, at least for the moment, more palatable. Events in Italy leading up 
to this moment are, again, impossible to chronicle today, but no matter how it was agreed, this 
truce is surely one of Chlothar’s more significant achievements, for his Italian realm managed to 
weather the seemingly undefeatable Narses. 
 
Childebert and the Empire, 546–558 
 
Given his deliberate two-pronged attack against Chlothar, we must also examine Childebert’s 
connections to the empire and why his death may have been particularly inopportune for 
Constantinople. Childebert, ironically, was the recipient of several letters from imperial Rome, so 
we can reconstruct in some detail his attitudes to Constantinople, making it all the more striking 
that the same sources have not been brought together with the sources for Justinian’s Frankish 
War. What evidence we can piece together from before 556 certainly suggests that Childebert 
was open to imperial diplomatic overtures. The earliest testament is admittedly inauspicious, for 
Childebert and his brothers first agreed to support the Romans against the Ostrogoths, before 
making a deal with the latter and reinforcing Gothic Italy instead.78 Later clues, however, suggest 
that Childebert had a change of heart, or that Constantinopolitan policy-makers had at least 
thought that the king became more amenable to imperial diplomacy. From the letters of Pope 
Vigilius (537–555), we learn that the pontiff urged the papal vicar for Gaul to ensure that 
Childebert keeps his agreements with Justinian in 545 and 546.79 After hearing of the fall of 
Rome in January 550 to Gothic forces, Vigilius further asked the vicar to urge the king to write 
to Totila and ensure that the Gothic ruler would not harm the church’s interests.80 The latter 
move is particularly revealing, for it implies that Childebert was seen by the pope as someone 
who could rein in Totila’s actions in Italy.81  
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 An appeal for support in the religious sphere would not also imply political connections, 
but in the case of Vigilius we can be more certain. In 545 and 546, for example, the pope had 
made clear that the appointment of two successive bishops of Arles as the papal vicar had 
required Justinian’s permission and the support of Belisarius, the chief imperial general in Italy.82 
The grant of a pallium to a Frankish bishop may appear at first glance to have been of little 
concern to Justinian, but these events need to be viewed through the prism of Childebert’s 
previous anti-imperial stance and his nephew Theudebert’s Italian acquisitions in the 540s.83 
Indeed, the timing of the two grants is suggestive of a more complex reality hidden by the 
sources. The former bishop of Arles, Auxanius, had announced his election in 543 to Vigilius, 
but only received the pallium in May 545.84 On the other hand, a sense of urgency can be 
discerned from his successor Aurelian’s reception of the pallium, as the twenty-three-year-old 
Aurelian received his privileges shortly after his elevation in 546.85 Vigilius’ grant to Aurelian was 
also likely linked to the grant of papal privileges to a monastery Childebert founded in 
November 547, which the king had specifically written to Rome for.86 As Vigilius appears to 
have served Justinian as a loyal advisor throughout the 540s, his letters thus suggest that tentative 
steps, at the very least, were made to align Childebert with the empire.87 Moreover, as these 
communications would have taken place at the same time as the fall of Rome to Totila and 
Theudebert’s treaty with the ascendant Gothic king in 546–7, it is tempting to think that the 
imperial court made improving relations with another Frankish ruler something of a priority. 
Childebert no doubt appreciated these timely concessions, for Aurelian was the son of another 
bishop favoured by the king and the monastery at Arles was a royal foundation, one of the first 
of its kind in the Merovingian kingdoms.88 Even if these grants had nothing to do with the 
Gothic War, the prompt fulfilment of Childebert’s wishes would nevertheless suggest a 
rapprochement with the Roman Empire from the mid-540s onwards, a move that had the 
approval of both Justinian and Belisarius.  
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 Austrasian Franks in Italy certainly remained a real and present danger, for Theudebald’s 
troops skirmished with imperial forces in 548 and would hinder Narses’ Italian expedition in 552, 
which suggests that the treaty with the Goths was indeed taken seriously by the Austrasian 
court.89 In this context, Procopius’ claim that a Frankish king had rejected Totila’s offer to wed a 
Merovingian princess takes on greater significance.90 The positioning of this anecdote suggests 
that it took place shortly before he captured Rome in 550, so Totila’s planned marriage alliance 
must have involved either a daughter of Childebert or Chlothar. As there is no evidence for 
Chlothar’s Italienpolitik at this point and given Vigilius’ letters, Childebert would be the likelier 
candidate to have distanced himself from Totila.91 This diplomatic repudiation provides a fitting 
context for Vigilius’ letter in 550, for Childebert was asked to again curtail Totila’s actions. Since 
Childebert had asked for and successfully received appointments and privileges from both Rome 
and Constantinople over the preceding decade, Vigilius and his handlers could have been quite 
confident that this request would not be rejected out of hand. Even if Childebert’s forces never 
involved themselves directly, it would have been advantageous for Justinian to at least sow 
divisions between the three Frankish kings, so that instead of facing a united Merovingian front 
as in the 530s, the Romans only had to contend with the young Theudebald. This then raises an 
interesting question for Childebert’s conflict with Chlothar after 555: with the two brothers 
actively fighting against each other while the latter was also contesting Italy, could Childebert 
have also been partly motivated by his links with the Roman Empire? 
 With this in mind, we must now turn to the much-maligned Three Chapters controversy, 
as the only sources for Childebert’s attitudes to the empire in the 550s are concerned with this 
particular dispute. The king seemingly took a strong interest in this theological debate, for he 
convened the fifth council of Orléans in October 549, where the bishops specifically 
anathematized two Christological heresies and aligned itself with the papacy, which has been 
conventionally viewed as evidence of the king’s pro-Three Chapters stance.92 This particular 
condemnation, however, remains a broad and general one, and not one that Justinian would have 
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disagreed with in any way, for he too anathematized the Eutychian and Nestorian heresies. 
Moreover, Bishop Aurelian of Arles had sent an envoy to Constantinople, a certain Anastasius, 
to specifically ask Vigilius about his doctrinal position.93 As the envoy reached the pope on 14 
July 549 and the pope only wrote a reply on 29 April 550, by the time the bishops had gathered 
at Orléans the Frankish church would have had no official confirmation of the papacy’s stance.94  
It would then be reasonable for the council to offer a universally acceptable formulation that still 
emphasized their adherence to the papacy, one that touched on the Christological debate of the 
day without committing explicitly to one position or the other. This is not to say the king and his 
bishops were disinterested. Despite Aurelian receiving privileges from Vigilius in previous years, 
by 549 he had evidently been under pressure to ask questions about the pope’s orthodoxy. 
Indeed, in the same letter Vigilius specifically warned Aurelian and other Frankish bishops not to 
heed “false writings”, which is surely an indication that a healthy debate on the Three Chapters 
was already raging in Gaul.95 The fact that Vigilius nevertheless mounted a defence of his 
doctrinal position at the same time as requesting Childebert to rein in Totila’s behaviour in this 
letter, however, suggests the productive relationship between Rome and Arles had yet to 
disintegrate.96 
 The divisions within the Frankish church are further evident in another letter written by 
the Milanese clergy to Merovingian envoys travelling to Constantinople around 552.97 This 
missive is much more hostile to Justinian’s doctrinal initiative, for it accuses Anastasius, the 
envoy from Arles, of supporting the imperial heresy and that he was given the difficult task of 
convincing the Frankish church of the same.98 This letter further urged the reader to write to the 
bishops of Provence, so that they too would in turn write to Pope Vigilius in Constantinople and 
oppose the condemnation of the Three Chapters.99 The recipients of the Milanese clergy’s 
exhortation are unfortunately unknown, with both envoys from Theudebald and Childebert 
being plausible targets.100 But even so, given the author’s warning of the spread of Anastasius’ 
deception in Gaul and the implication that some bishops in Provence did not yet feel the need to 
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write to Vigilius, it is plausible that at least some within the Frankish church were open to 
condemning the Three Chapters. As Arles was where Anastasius was originally sent from and 
presumably where his supposed deception was the most widespread, the same letter also supplies 
an indirect hint that Childebert’s attitudes regarding theology were likewise ambiguous. 
 If the reception in Gaul was not entirely hostile to imperial theology, but instead more 
mixed, then Childebert’s concerns from 556 onwards become more intelligible, for he and 
Sapaudus, Aurelian’s successor at Arles, would write letters to the newly-consecrated Pope 
Pelagius I on this matter. Again, questions were raised of the pope’s orthodoxy, but this did not 
prevent Childebert from acquiring what he sought, which was a pallium for Sapaudus, who had 
been bishop of Arles since 551.101 Pelagius further noted that he sent the requested relics to 
Childebert and to the monastery at Lérins.102 If the Frankish church was uniformly critical of the 
papacy’s condemnation of the Three Chapters, then these gifts would have been meaningless 
and would not have helped to enhance Childebert’s position.103 Instead, I suggest that it is more 
plausible to see the king as walking a fine line theologically, at once relaying the questions of 
those doubting Pelagius’ doctrinal purity and still using Rome to strengthen the see of Arles’ 
prestige, much as he had done while Aurelian was the bishop. Similarly to his predecessor, 
Sapaudus was the son of another prominent official serving Childebert, this time a certain 
Placidus, the governor of Provence.104 As this was now the second time Childebert had 
parachuted a loyalist scion into Arles, the king surely would have been aware that as the previous 
pope had needed permission from Justinian to grant the pallium, a request to another pontiff 
may have to meet the same requirement. Even if Pelagius’ letters do not explicitly say so, the 
emperor’s potential involvement must have weighed on the minds of everyone involved.105 As 
Pelagius granted the pallium relatively promptly, in February 557, the same urgency that led to 
the swift award to Aurelian in 546 may thus have also impacted on the pope’s thinking. Just as it 
was in the mid-540s, another Frankish king was fighting the empire, making it perhaps prudent 
for Rome to accede to Childebert’s wishes, lest he too become involved in Italy. 
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 Pelagius’ defence of his own doctrinal stance in these letters has rightfully been seen as 
rather desperate, for he blamed the theological furore on the long-dead Empress Theodora and 
shadowy “Nestorians” in Constantinople, when neither were involved in imperial policy-making 
in the 550s.106 We do, however, have grounds to think that his arguments still had some 
justification. Pelagius had already spent much time in the eastern Mediterranean as the papal 
envoy, gaining the favour of Justinian and involving himself in the affairs in the patriarchates of 
Alexandria and Jerusalem.107 His swift about-turn from a defender of the Three Chapters to an 
adherent of Justinian’s condemnation of the same texts, which facilitated his accession to the 
papal see, likewise suggests that he was a canny political operator.108  
 Pelagius’ letters to the Franks may thus have been written with more skill than historians 
today are willing to give him credit for. Battistella has already highlighted how the pope 
consistently tried to strengthen papal authority, perhaps even using the chaotic situation in the 
550s to extend his influence.109 Similarly, although the pope’s studious focus on the four earlier 
ecumenical councils, instead of the fifth and most recent council held at Constantinople in 553 
that condemned the Three Chapters, in his letters to Gaul (and indeed also in that of later popes) 
has conventionally been read as a rhetorical tool to ignore a particularly contentious issue, 
Pelagius was far from alone in doing so.110 Even though the eastern evidence remains uneven, it 
is nonetheless intriguing that both Patriarch John IV of Jerusalem (575–594) and Patriarch 
Sophronius of Jerusalem (634–c. 638) similarly prioritized the four earlier councils in their 
letters.111 A letter by Patriarch Eulogius of Alexandria (580–607) meanwhile was noted by the 
ninth-century Photius as not describing in detail the four ecumenical councils, causing the letter 
to be critiqued by a Roman pope.112 As Eulogius not outlining the four councils more explicitly 
was the highlighted critique, we might suppose then that the fifth council was not only neglected, 
but also that its omission was not a particular problem in either Alexandria or Rome. From this 
broader perspective, Pelagius’ letters may have been less desperate than commonly supposed, for 
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his discussion (or lack thereof) of the ecumenical councils followed the same convention as that 
adopted by sixth-century patriarchs of Jerusalem and Alexandria.113 
 Given his war-torn context, even if the pope was grasping at straws theologically, his 
communication with Childebert’s realm still had a very real use, for these letters were written at 
the same time as when Frankish armies battled Narses in Italy. With Childebert the only other 
Frankish king left standing after Theudebald’s death in 555 and his ongoing conflict with his 
brother, ensuring that Childebert did not decisively turn against Justinian was likely a priority for 
the empire. Fortunately for the pope, the king at least had kept somewhat of an open mind. 
Despite evidence of some doubt within his kingdom as early as 549, when an envoy had to be 
sent to Constantinople to quiz Vigilius regarding his orthodoxy, Childebert remained content to 
ask Pelagius to answer his detractors’ criticisms instead of attacking the pope directly.  
 This relatively neutral attitude can be contrasted with that of Nicetius of Trier, a bishop 
within Theudebald’s and then Chlothar’s kingdom, who wrote an undated letter addressed to 
Justinian attacking him as the “son of the devil”.114 We do not otherwise possess clues to other 
bishops’ views under Chlothar, but Nicetius’ example certainly provides a striking contrast with 
that of Sapaudus, for his letters to Rome were far from polemical. Pelagius’ laboured defence of 
his own orthodoxy was therefore a necessary one, for there remained a possibility that 
Childebert’s kingdom could remain on the sidelines, not openly condemning or supporting the 
Three Chapters. Even if the Frankish church stood resolutely against imperial religious policy, 
Pelagius’ efforts would have still mattered, if only to maintain a line of communication with 
Childebert, who was helping the imperial cause, perhaps inadvertently, by keeping Chlothar 
occupied on other fronts. Nor can we be so certain that Pelagius’ letters were in vain, for the last 
surviving letter to Gaul was composed between December 558 and February 559. This has surely 
more to do with the lack of surviving sources and does not suggest that the pope was no longer 
in contact with the Frankish church until his death in 561.115 Childebert’s death in December 558 
no doubt complicated matters, for his kingdom would be inherited by Chlothar, but as a truce in 
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Italy would soon be agreed, Pelagius’ influence could not have been negligible in peacetime 
either, if only due to the papal estates in Provence.116 Without further evidence, we cannot say 
that the pope’s case was entirely unconvincing. The Frankish church, after all, was willing to 
accept letters and relics from popes and emperors alike in the following decades, even though 
both Rome and Constantinople stood by their condemnation of the Three Chapters.117    
 The pope’s repeated requests for supplies from Gaul have similarly received a dim 
reception from modern historians, for they suggest that the papacy was thoroughly impoverished 
after the Gothic War.118 But if we situated his words in the context of the Frankish War, these 
requests take on greater significance, for Pelagius’ resources were no doubt constrained further 
by the fact that northern Italy remained in flames. Childebert’s kingdom on the other hand 
bordered Italy and was where the papal patrimony was located, which gave Pelagius yet another 
reason to secure Childebert’s friendship. Bronwen Neil and Pauline Allen have argued that 
Pelagius was careful to ascribe blame to neither the Goths nor the Romans in his letters to 
Sapaudus of Arles in 556–7, but the avoidance of blame is a delicate issue regarding the 
Merovingians as well.119 Battistella has rightfully pointed out that this silence has more to do with 
the pope’s relationship with the Franks, as it would have been impolitic to mention their 
involvement when Merovingian forces under Butilinus had recently intervened in the Gothic 
War.120 However, avoiding offending the Franks was a much more pressing issue in 556–7, for 
the devastation in Italy Pelagius described were not caused by the Goths or Butilinus, but Franks 
serving Chlothar. In letters sent to ensure that supplies would be sent from Frankish Provence to 
Rome, it would be all the more important to be silent about the ultimate source of the disasters 
facing Italy. This was certainly a calculated manoeuvre, for the pope had no problem noting the 
damage wrought by the Franks in another letter sent to a Roman general in 559.121 Pelagius had 
been dealt a bad hand by the circumstances, but in this instance his writings demonstrate how he 
was able to rework his message to suit different audiences.  
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 In another telling letter dated to April 557, Pelagius specifically asked for Placidus, the 
governor of Provence, to support Roman refugees fleeing war, which is another likely reference 
to the ongoing conflict in northern Italy.122 The pope again had to tread carefully, for the 
hostilities noted here could well have been the result of Chlothar’s Italian entanglements, which 
made this request to Placidus, who served Childebert, a rather delicate one. Here we can detect 
one final fruit of Pelagius’ efforts, for despite his sometimes unconvincing theological arguments, 
his letters to Gaul served an important purpose, to ameliorate the consequences of the Frankish 
War. The course of the conflict itself cannot be sketched out in any more detail, but in this letter 
we find the very human consequences of this conflict, a reality that we could only detect if we 
consider the Merovingian kingdoms as a whole, not focusing solely on individual rulers or 
specific aspects of their reign. 
 Even without Gregory of Tours and Marius of Avenches’ reports of their fraternal 
conflict, Pelagius’ words are sufficient to illustrate the strikingly different stances of Childebert 
and Chlothar towards the Roman Empire. Childebert may have had genuine qualms over the 
Three Chapters, but Pelagius’ letters suggest that they did not prevent the pope from seeking 
more material aid, nor, for that matter, hinder the king from requesting the pallium and relics 
from a theologically dubious pontiff. This is not to say that Childebert did not have his own 
reasons for attacking Chlothar. The latter had, after all, seized sole control of Theudebald’s 
territories in 555 instead of sharing the inheritance with his brother, but it is also unlikely that the 
Romans did not take into account this feud in their strategic calculations. Why else would 
Pelagius attempt to repeatedly persuade the Franks, particularly the bishop of Arles and 
Childebert, of his own and Justinian’s theological propriety? With the two Merovingian brothers 
already in conflict, it would have been an obvious move for the imperial church to step in and 
ensure that the one outstanding issue between the Frankish church and Rome, the Three 





Childebert’s death in 558 and the resulting end of military support for Chramn had thus come at 
a very fortunate time for Chlothar. Indeed, we hear of no further domestic trouble for Chlothar 
until 560, when Chramn made one last futile attempt at power and was executed by his father. 
We then have a plausible explanation for why elements of Frankish Venetia remained under 
Merovingian rule, for Narses no longer contended with a king beset on all fronts, but was now 
facing the ruler of a reunited Gaul. In these circumstances, agreeing to a truce that was relatively 
favourable to the Franks, that preserved some of their Italian holdings, would have been an 
eminently sensible decision by Narses. We know that this truce would not last, for in 561‒2 the 
Franks seemingly violated the terms and came to the aid of Gothic Verona, but by tracing how 
this truce came about, we can now state with more confidence how Merovingian history in the 
550s was entangled with the Mediterranean. 
 The Gothic War had ended in 552 with the fall of Totila and Teia, but the resulting 
Frankish interventions continued to devastate northern Italy in the following years. This decade 
is poorly served by the sources, but by bringing together what does survive, we can chart the 
broad contours of this conflict. By considering the different priorities of Chlothar and Childebert, 
whether dynastic politics or the murky problems posed by the Three Chapters controversy, this 
paper demonstrates the complexities of Frankish-Roman exchanges in the 550s and the necessity 
of consulting a wide range of Greek and Latin texts. In the process, new light can be shined on 
how Constantinople dealt with its enemies, such as the role played by the embattled Pelagius in 
bolstering links to Gaul. We owe much to Procopius and Agathias, but even without the words 
of these classicizing historians, Justinian’s Frankish War can still be chronicled and ought to be 
seen as a significant conflict in its own right. 
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